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Abstract 
We examine the relationship between globalisation, corporate governance and firm productivity by 
breaking down total effects into direct and indirect effects. The estimation results, using longitudinal 
data from Korea, indicate that the positive effect of liberalising equity ownership on firms’ total 
factor productivity (TFP) was reinforced by indirect managerial effects when a firm improved its 
corporate governance. Our findings also confirm that the interaction of the managerial effect with 
increased foreign equity ownership is more significant than interaction with exports, suggesting that 
liberalising foreign investment in the host market is more effective in capitalising on the potential 
benefits of corporate governance reform than increasing exports to overseas markets, reflected in 
learning by exporting.   
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1. Introduction  
 
Asian corporations have come to play a significant role in the global market (Peng, 
Bhagat & Chang, 2009), but have proved vulnerable to financial shocks (Forbes, 
2004). Recurrent financial crises have highlighted the importance of corporate 
governance and managerial effort in improving firm productivity in a rapidly 
globalising Asia. The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between 
corporate governance, globalisation and a firm’s total factor productivity (TFP) by 
disentangling total effects into direct and indirect effects. To realize our purpose, we 
use longitudinal data for Korea, where firms’ level of globalisation, measured by 
foreign equity ownership and exports, and corporate governance systems have 
changed significantly since the 1990s. Most existing corporate governance studies 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and share price or accounting 
performance.
1
 In contrast to the existing literature on accounting profits and/or share 
price effects of corporate governance, we examine the real consequences of changes 
in corporate governance, measured in terms of effects on a firm’s TFP. 
 There is much literature on the relationship between globalisation and TFP 
(see the survey in Tybout, 2000). However, there are few studies on how 
globalisation, particularly foreign ownership, affects firm productivity. A contribution 
of this paper is that, for the first time in the literature, we examine how managerial 
effects act as a conduit through which foreign equity ownership affects TFP.  The 
                                                 
1 Most of the existing literature suggests a positive association between corporate governance and 
accounting performance (see Morck, Wolfenzen & Yeung, 2005;  Perez-Gonzalez, 2006 for surveys). 
Studies of Korean firms based on this approach have produced similar results. Joh (2003) explored 
changes in accounting profits associated with corporate governance failure in Korean firms before the 
1997 financial crisis. Black, Jang and Kim (2006) reported that the share price of a firm increased 
sharply with the appointment of outside directors to more than 50 per cent of positions on the board. 
Park and Kim (2008) reported that the effectiveness of corporate governance on firms’ financial 
performance is bound to the institutional context created by government regulation.  
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originality of this paper is that it emphasises the importance of managerial effort as a 
determinant of different input combinations and in shifting the production function.  
Empirically, this paper extends Koke and Renneboog (2005) and Kose, Prasad 
and Terrones (2008) by focusing on the association between corporate governance, 
TFP and globalisation. However, this paper differs from Koke and Renneboog’s 
(2005) study in the following three respects. First, we consider the effect of both 
corporate governance and globalization on TFP, where globalisation was not 
considered by Koke and Renneboog (2005). Second, Koke and Renneboog’s (2005) 
measure of productivity was based on the traditional index-based measurement, which 
relies heavily on the assumption of perfect competition in factor markets and 
efficiency in resource allocation. The traditional index based measurement is also 
subject to problems relating to aggregation of inputs across agents and over time 
(Bartelsman & Doms, 2000). In view of these problems, this paper, following Olley 
and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), presents estimates of productivity 
that are based on the production function, explicitly taking into account estimation 
bias caused by simultaneity of productivity and factor demand. Third, in view of the 
studies by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003), which 
demonstrated that country-specific factors are important in understanding corporate 
governance, this paper focuses on Korean listed industrial firms that have experienced 
dramatic change in both their degree of globalisation and corporate governance 
system, which presents a different context from that of stable advanced economies.  
This paper also differs from Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2008) in that our 
focus is on the association between globalisation and productivity together with 
corporate governance in order to analyse indirect managerial effects. This approach 
enables us to investigate the channel through which globalisation affects productivity. 
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Moreover, our estimation uses firm-based data, rather than country-level aggregated 
data, which allows us to estimate firm productivity using advanced estimation 
methods in order to minimise possible endogeneity biases. 
Our contribution also differs from other recent related studies examining firm 
productivity growth. Baldwin and Yan (2012) examine the effect of market expansion 
on productivity growth, but do not consider either the role of corporate governance or 
globalisation. Similarly, Marrocu, Paci and Pontis (2012) examine the role of internal 
intangible capital on firms’ productivity, but do not consider either the role of 
corporate governance or globalisation effects. 
Foreshadowing our main results, we first find that the effects of globalisation 
on firm productivity are higher when globalisation is measured in terms of foreign 
equity ownership than exports. In the main results we find that a one standard 
deviation increase in foreign equity ownership increases average firm productivity 
more than a corresponding increase in exports by almost a factor of two. Second we 
find that globalisation improves firm productivity more in firms with better corporate 
governance arrangements and that this relationship is stronger when globalisation is 
measured in terms of foreign equity ownership than exports. To be specific, a 10 per 
cent increase in foreign equity ownership increases firm productivity by 9 per cent in 
firms with good corporate governance compared with 4 per cent in firms with poor 
corporate governance, while the corresponding figures for a 10 per cent increase in 
exports are 2.67 per cent and 0.67 per cent respectively.  This result suggests that 
liberalising foreign investment in the host market is more effective in capitalising on 
the potential benefits of corporate governance reform than increasing exports. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. The next section describes the Korean 
context. In Section 3 we outline existing theories on the relationship between 
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corporate governance, globalisation and firm productivity. This section presents our 
analytical framework, testable hypotheses and empirical specification used to test 
those hypotheses. In section 4 we describe the data.  The results are presented in 
Section 5. The final section concludes with a summary of the results. 
 
2. The Korean Context 
It is well known that the achievements of the Korean economy are largely due to its 
outward development strategies since the 1960s (see Amsden, 1989, among others). 
To secure foreign currency, exports were encouraged through various monetary and 
fiscal subsidies. In particular, the focus on heavy and chemical industries (HCI) 
strategically pursued in the 1970s reinforced the position of the existing business 
groups and promoted the formation of a number of new business groups. The 
government protected entrepreneurs’ ownership and managerial control by limiting 
foreign ownership to 10 per cent and prohibiting (hostile) mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) based on an expectation that these groups would foster HCI.  
The Korean government began to open equity markets to foreign investors in 
1992 when the economy required foreign capital because of accumulated current 
account deficits. However, the extent of foreign equity ownership was limited due to 
the restriction that foreigners not hold more than 50 per cent of the issued shares in 
Korean companies. The 1997 financial crisis, and the subsequent reforms, were a 
turning point that led to the relaxation of most restrictions on foreign ownership. The 
regulations governing foreign investors’ ownership of Korean firms were almost 
completely removed. Foreign equity investment has been liberalized, such that since 
May 1998 there are no restrictions, except for those industries involving national 
security concerns or cultural sensitivities, such as the mass media.  
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While Korean development was based on export-driven growth from the 
1960s and equity markets have been liberalised since the early 1990s, most Korean 
firms had weak corporate governance systems until the onset of the 1997 financial 
crisis. Virtually all of the (unitary) boards of directors (BOD) of Korean firms were 
appointed internally, and the controlling shareholder of the chaebol, as a non 
registered board member, held a significant amount of economic (and political) power 
(Kim & Kim, 2008). This power was backed up by his/her tenured position, which 
resulted from the complicated ownership arrangements between chaebol affiliates. 
Consequently, internally appointed board members tended to act as rubber stamps, 
and failed to monitor the actions of the controlling shareholder, even when resources 
were being squandered due to tunnelling and empire building.  
Following the 1997 financial crisis, however, a nation-wide reform began. 
Laws were amended to improve corporate governance and reform the chaebols. An 
outside director system was introduced to improve the monitoring function of 
company boards. In February 1998, the Listing Act was amended to require all listed 
firms, excluding the Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ), to 
appoint at least one outside director, with outside directors to comprise no less than a 
quarter of board members by the time of the firm’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
in 1999. This means that all listed firms must have a minimum of one outside director, 
and the number of additional outside members required depends on the size of the 
existing board. Following the first wave of reforms, focused on streamlining the 
business practices of chaebols in 1998 and 1999, the Korean government introduced a 
second wave of reforms, including amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law, 
in March 2001 and December 2003. These revisions of the Acts stipulate by law the 
1998 Listing Act’s requirement for outside directors for all listed firms on both the 
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Korea Exchange and the KOSDAQ (except for venture capital companies with an 
asset size of 100 billion won or less). They specifically require (1) large listed 
corporations to establish an Audit Committee and Appointment Committee under the 
BOD that is comprised mainly of outside directors, (2) that no fewer than half the 
board members of large firms should be outside directors, and (3) that large firms 
listed on the Korea Exchange and KOSDAQ should have at least three outside 
directors and at least half the board positions should be filled by outside directors.  
Owing to these regulatory reforms to board structure and the development of a 
market for outside directors, listed firms began to appoint outside directors in 1999. 
Table 1 shows the proportion of outside directors in firms on the Korea Exchange. 
Table 1 indicates that the proportion of listed firms with at least one outside director 
increased significantly from 34 per cent in 1999 to 62.3 per cent in 2000 and to 95 per 
cent in 2007. Both introduction of the new regulations and the development of a 
market for outside directors were main reasons for this sharp increase. The table also 
shows that the most common number of outside directors per firm was two. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 & Fig. 1 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 1 shows trends in the size of the BOD, the number of outside directors 
(left axis) and the ratio of outside directors to total board members on the BOD (right 
axis) between 1999 and 2007. It illustrates that the number of outside directors, 
compared to total board members, increased significantly over this period of time. 
The ratio of outside directors to total members on the BOD has continued to increase 
and reached 0.33 in 2007. This increase reflected the firms’ strategic choice to 
downsize their boards (i.e. the denominator), coupled with the appointment of outside 
directors (i.e. the numerator) to comply with regulatory requirements.  
 
 8 
3. Research Hypotheses and Estimation Model 
3.1 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
Permitting foreign equity ownership potentially has several advantages in terms of 
enhancing firm productivity. It improves resource allocation, bringing so-called 
indirect collateral benefits (Mishkin, 2006). These collateral benefits include 
development of the domestic financial sector to facilitate corporate financing, 
improvements in institutions, and better macroeconomic policies (Kose, Prasad & 
Terrones, 2008). Certain types of capital inflows, such as FDI, often defined as 
foreign equity ownership of more than 10 per cent, can increase productivity in the 
host economy through technology diffusion and vertical spillovers (see Keller, 2004 
and references therein) and technology creation through multinational companies 
activities. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) illustrated that multinational enterprises 
share their productivity abroad by transplanting their organisation structures and 
management practices. This internal transfer will be preferred to the extent that the 
market fails due to asymmetric information between buyers and sellers of the 
technology (see Markusen, 1995 among others) and/or firm-specific assets (Dunning, 
1993). Further, this direct investment can generate productivity spillovers for other 
domestic companies horizontally in the same industries (Blomstrom, Kokko & Zejan, 
2000). Vertical integration can also increase productivity in the host economy, due 
partly to imported intermediate goods (Markusen & Venables, 1999; Amiti & 
Konings, 2007). Horizontal, or intra-industry, spillovers refer to technology diffusion 
through the movement of workers within industries, learning-by-observing and 
promoting competition, whereas vertical spillovers refer to inter-industry diffusion 
through buyer-supplier linkages, either in upstream or downstream industries. 
Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) found that firm-embedded productivity, such as 
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management know-how, accounted for around 16 per cent of output differences 
between FDI source and host countries. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1: Increased foreign equity ownership has a positive effect on firm productivity. 
 
In addition to these well-established arguments, we particularly note that 
foreign equity ownership can improve the host economy’s corporate governance 
structure and institutions, defined broadly. Martin (1978) and Martin and Page (1983) 
illustrated that an increase in competitive pressures, due to globalisation, could 
improve intra-firm efficiency. This is similar to Leibenstein’s (1966, 1978) concept of 
‘X-inefficiency’, which is defined as the difference between actual productivity and 
the maximum feasible productivity. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2005) suggest that a less 
effective corporate governance system tends to lead to lower productivity growth. 
Enhancement in productivity could either be from imitation and/or direct intervention 
from foreign investors. It is natural for foreign investors to protect their investment as 
a form of risk management and thus to demand better corporate governance.  
The corporate governance literature suggests that better corporate governance 
will positively affect firm productivity by providing managerial incentives to improve 
allocative efficiency, input combination and productive-enhancing investment with 
lower cost of capital. Differences in corporate governance might lead to divergence in 
managerial behaviour and different evolution of firm productivity paths. Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2007) and Coffee (1984) follow Stigler’s price dispersion 
argument from the 1960s, and contend that corporate governance improves the 
allocative efficiency of the factor (capital) market. This in turn implies improved 
productivity. Good corporate governance helps to resolve market failures caused by 
asymmetric information and thus enables firms to access capital markets on better 
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terms. Bartelsman and Doms (2000) point out that a firm’s (managerial) decisions, 
including input choices, is one of the determinants of its productivity.  
Combining the individual positive effects of corporate governance and foreign 
equity ownership on firm productivity allows us to consider interaction effects. We 
call this the managerial vigilance effect of foreign equity ownership. Increased foreign 
equity ownership, coupled with improved corporate governance, can either influence 
management directly (i.e. via FDI) or increase participation of foreign ownership in 
business decisions and influence the selection of management.  This suggests our 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Liberalising equity ownership will have a stronger positive effect on productivity 
in firms with better corporate governance than with poor corporate governance. 
 
Trade liberalisation can also have a positive effect on TFP through a learning-
by-exporting effect (see eg. De Loecker, 2007; Takii, 2005; Fernandes, 2007; 
Baldwin & Gu, 2004 and references therein).  First, export orientation enables firms 
to leverage their existing capabilities across countries and create scale economies 
otherwise not available domestically.  Second, firms may learn about new 
technologies by exporting to knowledgeable buyers who share product designs and 
production techniques.  Third, participation in export markets brings firms into 
contact with international best practices, which fosters learning and productivity 
growth.  Fourth, participation in export markets may provide incentives to improve 
efficiency because of the intensity of international competition. As competition is 
related to high innovation and productivity growth, foreign competition provides a 
mechanism through which exporting raises productivity growth.  Thus, we have our 
third hypothesis: 
H3: Increased exports have a positive effect on firm productivity. 
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Heterogeneous firm trade models suggest that internationalisation has a 
positive effect on the productivity of some firms, while simultaneously forcing other 
firms to exit the market (see eg. Melitz, 2003). While one would expect that exporting 
and investing in productivity are complementary activities, it remains that exporting 
activity also makes firms more susceptible to international demand shocks, meaning 
that exporting activity is an additional source of uncertainty for the firm.  Amore and 
Zaldokas’ (2011) results suggest that corporate governance is one of the main factors 
determining which firms are likely to benefit from trade liberalization. Firms with 
better corporate governance are better placed to take advantage of complementarities 
between exporting and investing in productivity and are less susceptible to 
international demands shocks that might force them to exit the industry.  
Productivity growth will be higher in exporters that develop the absorptive 
capacities to take advantage of productivity gains associated with innovation. Better 
levels of investor protection are positively related to investment in research and 
development (Hillier, Pindado, de Queiroz & de la Torre, 2009).  Firms with better 
corporate governance will be more likely to develop those absorptive capacities, 
because they will be more likely to invest in research and development.  Given these 
arguments, we suggest a fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Increased exports will have a stronger positive effect on productivity in firms 
with better corporate governance than in firms with poor corporate governance 
 
3.2 Estimation Model  
To test our research hypotheses consider the following unobserved effects model with 
an interaction variable. 
ititis
ititititit ionGlobalisatGovernanceionGlobalisatGovernanceTFP




βxμ '
  (1)  
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here i indexes firms from 1 to N and t indexes time periods (years) from 1 to T. TFP, 
Governance and Globalisation refer respectively to firm total factor productivity, 
corporate governance and globalisation activities through liberalising equity ownership 
and exports.  and   respectively capture the effect of corporate governance and its 
interaction with globalisation activities, which are of primary interest in this research. 
The year-specific effect is measured by 


T
s
s st
1
][1μ Tsst 1]}[1{  , where the indicator 
function of [ ] is one if the condition of [ ] is satisfied and zero otherwise. While we are 
not directly interested in the estimated coefficients of time-specific variables, year-
specific variables capture effects that are specific to the period in which they occur but 
common to all firms, including various macroeconomic and political shocks. i  
captures time invariant unobserved firm-specific effects. The firm-specific 
unobservable effects control for managerial style and/or work environment. For 
example, business group LG in Korea emphasises ‘harmony’ as its work culture, 
whereas Samsung stresses ‘organisational power’ and Hyundai a ‘can do’ approach. 
Further to this standard estimation model, following Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles’ 
(1990), we also include a time trend to capture the evolving nature of productivity. 
 β represents a vector of coefficients associated with a vector of time-varying 
β  observed regressors at the firm level, 'itx . itx  includes R&D investment 
(McGuckin, Streitwieser & Doms, 1998), market structure (Syverson, 2004), human 
capital and the quality of the workforce (Doms, Dunne & Troske, 1997) as well as the 
regulatory environment (Brown, Earle & Telegdy, 2006). 
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4. Data and Measurement of Dependent Variable 
We employed longitudinal data for publicly traded Korean firms over the period 
1990-2007. The three key variables of interest are estimated productivity, which is the 
dependent variable, outside directors, which is a proxy for corporate governance, and 
foreign equity ownership and exports, which are both proxies for globalisation. Data 
for the estimation of productivity were collected from the Japan Center for Economic 
Research (JCER) database and the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA), 
whereas data for the independent variables are largely from the KLCA database. 
 
4.1 Productivity as the Dependent Variable 
The JCER database provides gross output, intermediate inputs, labor and capital stock 
in real values. Gross output, intermediate inputs and capital stock are in million won 
and converted into 1990 values as a base using the appropriate price index, including 
intermediate goods and the material deflator provided by the Bank of Korea (BOK). 
Labor inputs, in thousand-hours calculated by the number of employees, were 
obtained from each firm’s financial statements and industry average labor hours were 
obtained from the Monthly Labor Survey of Korea, Ministry of Labor and the Korea 
Information Service (KIS). To calculate capital costs, the database used interest rates 
from the BOK, own capital ratio from KIS (financial statement) and deflators for 
building and structure, machinery, tools and vehicles from the BOK. If a company 
was delisted in a particular year, that company was not included in the database in 
subsequent years. Thus, the number of listed firms varied on an annual basis. We 
included industrial firms only, which left us with 15,392 firm-year observations. In 
addition, we obtained information about electricity and water energy costs from the 
KLCA database. To make them consistent with JCER data, the data from the KLCA 
were deflated using the production price index for fuel energy provided by the BOK.  
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Table 2 presents data on the average value of outputs and aggregate inputs. 
Table 2 indicates that the natural logarithm of average output for listed firms 
increased over the sample period: from 11.21 in 1990 to 12.11 in 2007. The table also 
shows that Korean listed firms reduced their labor intensive production, due mainly to 
greater use of capital. Firms’ use of labor has continued to decline, while their use of 
capital has increased before declining to some extent since 2000. The pattern of water 
and energy use by firms was similar to that of capital use, and the use of intermediate 
goods continued to increase over the same period.  
------------------- 
Insert Table 2 
------------------------- 
To calculate productivity we follow the following two steps. First, we identify 
parameters in an estimation model suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This entails selecting a proxy variable to correct for 
simultaneity bias.  Olley and Pakes (1996) use firm investment to correct the 
simultaneity bias between the input choices of firms and privately known 
productivity. However, using investment for this purpose is potentially problematic 
given that investment is lumpy, which may bias annual estimates of productivity. 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggested employing intermediate inputs, such as fuel 
and energy, to control for that part of productivity observed by the firm’s decision 
maker and correlated with input choice. This overcomes the lumpiness problem 
caused by inverting the investment function as in Olley and Pakes (1996).  
We used the Levinsohn and Petrin estimator in all benchmark estimations, 
while the Olley-Pakes estimator, coupled with the fourth order polynomial expansion 
method, was employed as a robustness check. For the Levinsohn and Petrin method, 
the natural log of labor was used as a freely-variable input, the natural log of 
electricity was employed as the proxy variable and the natural log of capital stock was 
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employed as the state variable. The dependent variable in this model specification is 
the natural log of gross output, proxied by the natural log of total sales in real terms. 
Coefficients for the freely variable input, proxy and state variables were obtained via 
GMM estimation with contemporaneous natural log of capital and lag-one of the 
proxy variable as instruments. Second, armed with the estimated parameters from the 
first stage, we calculated the SIC 4-digit industry-demeaned productivity level 
following the method suggested by Van Biesebroeck (2007).  
 
4.2 Corporate Governance and Globalisation Proxies 
The KLCA database provides a wide range of information including balance sheet, 
income statement, stock price, auditor’s opinion, and general information about stock-
listed and KOSDAQ-listed corporations. Our data set excluded KOSDAQ-listed firms 
and financial companies to increase comparability between firms.  
The KLCA database provides information on both the numbers of outside 
directors and total board members from 1999.  We included outside directors who had 
their own office in a firm as well as those who did not have their own office, although 
the majority of outside directors are external. The database provides information on 
the percentage of equity owned by foreigners. Domestic firms’ exports are also 
obtained from the KLCA database in domestic currency.  
Corporate governance was proxied by the appointment of outside directors, 
combined with the ratio of outside directors to board members. Specifically, we 
define a binary variable as one when a firm appointed at least one outside director(s) 
and zero otherwise. An advantage of this binary definition for corporate governance is 
that it allows us to interpret its interaction variables more clearly than with a 
continuous variable. In an attempt to overcome the limitation of this binary variable, 
we also use the ratio of outside directors in the board to examine the effect of the 
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density of outside directors. We measure the extent of a firm’s globalisation by (1) 
foreign ownership, calculated by the proportion of total issued stock owned by foreign 
investors, and (2) exports, denoted as exports as a percentage of total sales.  
Table 3 shows that both the average number of outside directors and the 
proportion of outside directors on the board have increased since 2000. The average 
number of outside directors (the ratio of outside directors on the BOD) for listed firms 
has increased from 1.35 (0.21) in 2000 to 2.22 (0.35) in 2007. This increase was due 
largely to changes in legal requirements, including the Listing Act and the Securities 
and Exchange Acts described above. 
Table 3 also shows that foreign equity ownership in domestic firms in 2007 
was around five times higher than in 1990, due largely to liberalised foreign 
ownership and improvements in the reputation of Korean firms in the global market. 
The average listed firm’s ratio of exports to total sales also increased until 2000, 
before declining marginally since the mid 2000s. This decline may reflect resurgence 
in protectionism by Korea’s major export markets, including the United States, in 
response to the deterioration in their current account balances. 
------------------- 
Insert Table 3 
------------------ 
5. Results  
5.1 Benchmark Estimation: Without Interaction Variable 
Firm TFP in all specifications, except the robustness checks, were estimated by the 
Levinsohn and Petrin estimator using GMM. Table 4 presents the baseline estimates 
The coefficients on outside directors in Table 4 indicate the magnitude of the 
difference between the TFP of firms with at least one outside director and firms with 
no outside directors. The estimation results, based on the restricted regression (Models 
1 and 2), imply that the productivity premium for a firm with good corporate 
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governance is 0.05-0.08. This is equivalent to a 3-5 per cent premium on the mean 
value of TFP. There are two caveats to interpreting this result. First, the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficient of corporate governance is not robust. Model 
(2) includes time effects in addition to the unobserved firm-specific effects to control 
for year-specific shocks affecting all firms in the same way. The coefficient on outside 
directors in Model (1) is insignificant, while the estimated coefficient on outside 
directors in Model (2) is marginally significant. In addition, Models (1) and (2) largely 
reflect the ‘total’ amount of association between outside directors and productivity, as 
the models have no (time-varying) control variables. In other words, it shows the direct 
effect of outside directors as well as the indirect effect through the omitted intervening 
variable. Thus, it may capture a spurious association. 
------------------- 
Insert Table 4 
------------------ 
Models (3) and (4) include a foreign ownership variable and other time-
varying control variables. The coefficients on outside directors in (3) and (4) are no 
longer significant at the conventional level, whereas foreign ownership is significant. 
The preferred model  (Model (4)) indicates that an increase of ten per cent in foreign 
ownership, given other control variables, improves TFP by around 6 per cent of its 
mean value. A similar outcome was found when we used the ratio of exports to sales 
as a proxy for globalisation, although the magnitude of the estimated coefficient was 
smaller than that for foreign ownership. Models (4) and (6) provide support for the 
effect of globalisation on firm productivity, consistent with H1 and H3. To compare 
the economic effects of foreign investment and exports, we standardised these 
variables so that the coefficients represent the estimated increase in population mean 
TFP when the variables increase by one standard deviation. A one standard deviation 
increase in foreign equity ownership increased mean TFP more than a corresponding 
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increase in exports by almost a factor of two. Most other variables are not significant, 
apart from industry concentration, proxied by the Hirfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). 
 
5.2 Benchmark Estimation 2: Separating Total Effects with an Interaction Variable 
The results in Table 5 examine the interaction effects between corporate governance 
and globalisation, proxied by either the share of foreign ownership in issued stocks 
(Models 1-3) or the ratio of exports to sales (Models 4-6).  
First, the results in rows 2 and 4 show that the interaction variables are 
significant at the 1 per cent level, irrespective of model specification and the proxies 
for globalisation. Statistics for the F-test for the joint null of the outside directors and 
the interaction variables, as well as the outside directors and globalisation variables, 
were large enough to reject the null hypothesis of no effect at the 1 per cent level.  
The results from Model (3) imply that an increase of ten percentage points in 
foreign equity ownership is associated with a 9 per cent increase in the mean TFP of 
firms with good corporate governance and 4 per cent in the mean TFP of firms with 
poor governance.  This result is consistent with H2. The difference in TFP increases is 
due to (indirect) managerial effects in conjunction with liberalisation as indicated by 
the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable. Estimated coefficients also imply 
that the liberalisation effect through managerial vigilance is greater than the direct 
effect of the liberalisation itself. Our result supports Kose, Prasad and Terrones’ (2008) 
findings and confirms the estimation results without interaction variables in Table 4. 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient of foreign ownership in Table 5, however, 
is smaller than that in Table 4. This is because the total (positive) effect of foreign 
ownership is divided into (positive) direct and (positive) indirect effects. The positive 
sign of the estimated coefficient indicates that foreign investors’ equity investment is 
associated with improved allocative efficiency, spillover effects and better access to 
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new technology (Blomstrom, Kokko & Zejan, 2000). More importantly, the 
significance of the interaction variable between foreign ownership and corporate 
governance, measured by the appointment of outside directors, illustrates that the 
positive direct effect of foreign investment on TFP was reinforced by a positive 
indirect effect occurring through managerial vigilance, consistent with H1 and H2.  
The last three columns report the relationship between exports with TFP in 
conjunction with corporate governance. The results in Models (5) and (6) show that the 
direct effect of exports was not significant at the conventional level, whereas 
interaction of exports with corporate governance was significant at the 1 per cent level. 
This suggests that the improvement in TFP resulting from learning-by-exporting in the 
global market associated with exports may not be sizeable, which is confirmed by 
Bernad and Jensen (1995) for the United States and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) 
for Colombia and Morocco. The results in the table, however, imply that export-led 
competitive pressure in the global market exists. The results from Model (6) imply that 
an increase of ten percentage points in exports is associated with a 2.67 per cent 
increase in the mean TFP of firms with good corporate governance and 0.67 per cent in 
the mean TFP of firms with poor governance, which is consistent with H4.  
When these findings are considered together, we find that the direct positive 
effect on firm TFP of improved corporate governance through the appointment of 
outside directors is not robust, but that an indirect positive effect occurs through 
interaction with the firm’s globalisation activities, consistent with H2 and H4. In 
particular, the results suggest that the interaction effect due to the liberalisation of 
foreign ownership (H2) is greater than that due to export activities (H4). 
------------------- 
Insert Table 5 
------------------ 
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5.3 Effects of the Proportion of Outside Directors 
The outside directors variable, defined dichotomously, is useful to interpret the 
interaction variable clearly and to examine the difference between firms with outside 
directors and firms without them. However, it has limitations in analysing the effect of 
the density of outside directors. To examine the linearity of the managerial effect on 
productivity, we generated two additional binary variables. One indicates a group of 
firms having BODs with a high density of outside directors and the other group with a 
low density of outside directors. The threshold levels for high and low density outside 
directors were respectively the 75 percentile and 25 percentile values on the spectrum 
representing the ratio of outside directors to total directors on the BOD.  
We expect that if a high proportion of outside directors are desirable for 
monitoring managers, and thus productivity, the improvement in TFP of firms with a 
high density of outside directors would be greater than that of firms with a low density 
of outside directors. The results in Table 6 support this proposition, as indicated by the 
second and third rows in the upper panel (i.e., Low Density of Outside Directors) and 
the second row in the middle panel (i.e. High Density of Outside Directors). The 
interaction variable for the low density firms, ForeignOwnBODOD pc 252 , is not 
significant. By contrast, the coefficient of the interaction variable for the high density 
firms, ForeignOwnBODOD pc 752 , is significant at the 10 per cent level and the total 
effect (including both direct and interaction effects) of a high proportion of outside 
directors based on the mean value of foreign ownership is greater than that for a firm 
with poor corporate governance by 0.12 units of TFP. When we use exports as a proxy 
of globalisation, the interaction term is significant for both the low density and high 
density of outside directors.  The magnitude of the coefficient of 
ExportBODOD pc 752  was greater than that of ExportBODOD pc 252 .  This finding 
 21 
implies that the effect of outside directors interacting with the firm’s liberalising 
ownership strategies on TFP is linear as there was little positive interaction effects for 
the firm with a low density of outside directors, whereas there was significant positive 
interaction effects for firms with a high density of outside directors.  
------------------- 
Insert Table 6 
------------------ 
 
5.4 Chaebol Affiliates versus Independent Firms 
Schulze et al. (2003) highlighted the importance of ownership dispersion among the 
directors of private family firms. Given the importance of chaebols and power of the 
controlling shareholder of chaebols (Chang & Hong, 2003), we conjecture that the 
productivity effect of globalisation may be more attenuated in chaebol affiliates than 
in independent firms.  In the past, the controlling shareholders of chaebols exercised 
power directly over the firm’s production decisions, as well as indirectly by 
controlling the management of affiliates by holding tenured positions without legal 
responsibility. Excessive investment for building a business empire might have 
resulted in tunnelling and inefficiency (Chang, 2003; Bae, Kang & Kim, 2002; Joh, 
2003). Many of the amendments to laws following the 1997 crisis sought to rectify 
this problem, including a legal requirement for the controlling shareholder to be a 
registered board member and the strengthening of minority shareholder rights.  
To examine any difference between chaebol affiliates and stand-alone firms, 
we divided the sample into two groups: firms belonging to the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission-designated chaebols and others. The results, reported in Table 7, indicate 
that the indirect effect of improved corporate governance through the appointment of 
outside directors interacting with globalisation is more prominent for independent 
firms than for chaebol affiliates. Both ODForeignOwn and ODExports for chaebol 
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affiliates were not significant, but they were significant at the conventional level for the 
independent firms. However, the chi-square test between the two coefficients was 0.15, 
so we could not reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are not different.  
The results also indicate that the positive Shumpeterian effect of monopolistic 
firms on TFP was more significant for chaebol affiliates than for independent firms, 
but the vintage effect of capital stock operated in the opposite direction.  The negative 
coefficient on the variable denoting patent costs for chaebol affiliates may suggest that 
purchasing patents from another company through arm’s length transactions dilutes a 
firm’s R&D efforts and thus has a negative effect on productivity. 
----------------- 
Insert Table 7 
------------------ 
 
5.5 Treatment of Autocorrelation 
To examine possible serial correlation over time, we re-estimated the baseline model 
with interaction variables after explicitly considering the first-order autoregressive 
model.
2
 Table 8 reports our results. The interaction effects of improved corporate 
governance, measured by the appointment of outside directors, and foreign ownership 
(ODForeignOwn) remained significant regardless of model specification. The F-
statistic for the joint null of outside directors and its interaction with foreign ownership 
is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis at the conventional level. By contrast, 
the interaction variable, ODExports, was not significant, although the export variable 
itself, given other control variables, was significant in Model (6). This finding also 
confirms that the interaction of the managerial effect with foreign ownership is more 
significant than its interaction with arm’s length competition through exports. 
 
                                                 
2
 The estimation method included two steps: estimation of the first-order autocorrelation to remove the 
effect of the AR (1) error and mean-difference to eliminate firm-specific effects. 
 23 
 
----------------- 
Insert Table 8 
------------------ 
In estimates, which are not reported, we included a time trend and found 
similar estimation results.  We also explicitly considered a binary variable, defined as 
one if the year was 1997 or 1998 and zero otherwise, to capture the effect of the 
financial crisis. The estimated coefficient of this crisis variable from the baseline 
estimation with interaction variables was significant for Models (2) and (4) of the six 
model specifications. However, the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients 
of the interaction variables across the models remained similar to the baseline 
estimation, although the magnitude of the coefficients fell by a small margin.  
 
5.6 Treatment of Endogeneity Bias 
We considered three possible causes of endogeneity problems. The first was the 
correlation between the included regressors and unobserved firm-specific factors, and 
this was addressed by the within estimator. An example of this correlation would be the 
situation where a particular managerial style or firm image either attracts or deters 
foreign investment and overseas demand for the firm’s outputs as well as TFP. The 
second and third concerns were estimation bias caused by self-selection and reverse 
causality. Self-selection bias arises either from the estimation of the TFP and/or from 
the estimation of Equation (1). The former can be addressed through employing either 
the Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.   
In terms of the estimation of Equation (1), the appointment of outside directors 
in Korea was largely driven by legal requirements, whereby selection bias is not the 
major concern. However, a firm’s globalisation strategy could be a choice variable 
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rather than a matter of obligation.
3
 A firm’s choice of globalisation strategy also 
depends on productivity, whereby reverse causality causes an endogeneity problem. 
Foreign investors’ investment decisions, for example, may depend on a firm’s past 
productivity. In this context, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) provide evidence against 
such reverse causality by showing that, among developing economies, net capital 
inflows are negatively correlated with productivity growth. Further to this evidence, we 
re-estimated the baseline estimation assuming that foreign investment and exports were 
endogenous variables. Instead of an ad hoc type regression with a lagged (suspected) 
endogenous variable, we used the instrumental variable method.  The results are 
reported in Table 9. Foreign ownership, exports and their interaction variables were 
treated as endogenous. The instrumental variables used include first and second lags of 
endogenous variables as well as net profit per share for all models and dividend payout 
ratio for foreign ownership for Models 1 and 2. Similar to the findings in Gourinchas 
and Jeanne (2007), the results suggest that endogeneity bias due to reverse causality is 
not a major concern in Table 5. Both interaction variables, ODForeignOwn and 
ODExports remained significant with the expected signs.  
----------------- 
Insert Table 9 
------------------ 
 
5.7 Alternative Measure of Productivity 
As a robustness check on our baseline estimation using the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) method, we estimated TFP using the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator (with 
minor modification), which inverts the investment function.
4
  The results are reported 
                                                 
3
 A more rigorous analysis of the cause and effect relationship between exports and productivity 
requires knowledge of the clearly defined initial timing of a firm’s exports, which is beyond the scope 
of our sample period for most firms.  
4
 Our estimates do not consider the potential estimation bias caused by a firm’s self-selective exit due to 
absence of exit information from our databases. The inverted investment function gives an observable 
expression for productivity in the production function. First, we ran a regression to estimate the 
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in Table 10.  Similar to the baseline specification reported in Table 5, all interaction 
variables remained significant at the conventional level for ODForeignOwn (and at 
the 10 per cent level for ODExports). Foreign Ownership was significant irrespective 
of model specification, whereas the robustness of the Exports variable was sensitive to 
model specification. These findings again show that the direct effect of the 
appointment of outside director/s itself on TFP could be open to debate, but its indirect 
effect (i.e. managerial vigilance) when interacted with globalisation (foreign ownership 
or exports) is important, consistent with H2 and H4.   
----------------- 
Insert Table 10 
------------------ 
 
6. Conclusion  
Examining the relationship between corporate governance, globalisation and firm 
productivity is an important issue, as evidenced by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
This paper explored the managerial vigilance effect of liberalising equity ownership, 
arguing that any positive effects of foreign equity ownership on TFP will be enhanced 
when improved corporate governance leads to a better managerial effect. To achieve 
this goal, we disentangled the effect of the interaction between foreign equity 
ownership and corporate governance on TFP from the total effects. Exploring real 
consequences (i.e. effects on productivity) differentiates our paper from most of the 
extant corporate governance literature that focuses on accounting/financial variables. 
Moreover, in contrast to existing literature on globalisation and TFP, we also explicitly 
took account of managerial effects associated with liberalising foreign ownership. 
                                                                                                                                            
coefficient on the natural log of labor coupled with intermediate goods, measured by water and energy 
costs, and the coefficient of capital by the combination of investment and capital for fourth order 
expansion. We also tested the third order expansion, but the estimates did not change.  
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The results based on longitudinal data from Korea, where equity ownership 
and corporate governance systems have changed significantly since the 1990s, indicate 
that the positive effect of liberalisation on firm TFP was strengthened by indirect 
managerial effects when a firm improved its corporate governance arrangements. Our 
results also indicate that this channelling effect is monotonic in that both the 
appointment of outside directors and the proportion of outside directors on the board 
are important in determining the interaction effect. In addition, our findings confirm 
that the interaction of the managerial effect with increased foreign equity ownership is 
more significant than interaction with arm’s length competition from exports. 
Therefore, we conclude that liberalising foreign equity ownership (in a small, open 
economy) is more effective in capitalising on the potential benefits of corporate 
governance by generating managerial effects than increasing exports to overseas 
markets.   
Further investigation revealed that the effect of the interaction between indirect 
managerial incentives and foreign equity ownership was more evident for independent 
firms than for chaebol affiliates. However, the differences between the interaction 
variables for the two sets of firms were not statistically significant, implying that this 
finding is tentative, rather than conclusive. Consideration of the different managerial 
responses to increased foreign ownership between chaebol affiliates and independent 
firms, if any, is an interesting research question that awaits future research.  
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TABLE 1: Outside directors in corporations listed on the Korea exchange (%) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total Listed 
Corporations 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Firms without 
outside director 
66.0 37.7 34.6 29.6 22.4 23.6 17.9 17.6 5.7 
Firms with at 
least one outside 
director  
34.0 62.3 65.4 70.4 77.6 76.4 82.1 82.4 94.3 
No. of outside 
directors per firm  
= 1  
= 2  
 3  
 
 
16.4 
10.2 
7.3 
 
 
19.0 
27.0 
16.3 
 
 
22.5 
28.1 
14.7 
 
 
22.8 
30.1 
17.5 
 
 
24.1 
32.5 
21.1 
 
 
23.5 
31.0 
22.0 
 
 
26.9 
32.5 
22.8 
 
 
28.1 
29.1 
25.2 
 
 
32.4 
33.7 
28.1 
Notes: Discrepancies, if any, between the total number at the bottom and in row 3 are due to rounding 
errors. Compilation was based on the KLCA database. We dropped firms if the size of the BOD is zero. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Trends in the size of the BOD, number of outside directors and ratio 
of outside directors to total directors on the BOD for listed firms 
 
BOD (Left axis)
Outside Director/BOD (Right axis)
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Notes: The left and right axes respectively refer to the number of members on the BOD and the number 
of outside directors, and the ratio of outside directors/total directors on the BOD.  
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TABLE 2: Average values of the logarithm of output and production inputs 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
 
Ln (output) 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
 
 
11.21 
(1.30) 
{10.2,12.0} 
[372] 
 
11.73 
(1.32) 
{10.7,12.4} 
[384] 
 
11.94 
(1.37) 
{10.8,12.3} 
[393] 
 
12.07 
(1.49) 
{11.1,12.7} 
[413] 
 
12.11 
(1.56) 
{11.1,12.9} 
[401] 
Ln (intermediate) 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
11.1 
(1.29) 
{10.1,11.8} 
[372] 
11.4 
(1.37) 
{10.5,12.1} 
[384] 
11.7 
(1.37) 
{10.8,12.3} 
[393] 
11.85 
(1.47) 
{10.9,12.4} 
[413] 
11.92 
(1.54) 
{10.9,12.7} 
[402] 
 
Ln (capital) 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
10.12 
(1.44) 
{9.1,11.0} 
[372] 
10.67 
(1.50) 
{9.5,11.5} 
[384] 
11.13 
(1.59) 
{10.0,11.9} 
[393] 
10.91 
(1.67) 
{9.8,11.7} 
[413] 
10.86 
(1.80) 
{9.7,11.7} 
[405] 
 
Ln (labor) 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
7.56 
(1.18) 
{6.6,8.3} 
[372] 
7.49 
(1.18) 
{6.6,8.2} 
[384] 
7.25 
(1.17) 
{6.47,7.89} 
[393] 
6.98 
(1.30) 
{6.15,7.64} 
[413] 
6.92 
(1.40) 
{6.0,7.6} 
[395] 
 
Ln (electricity) 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
9.83 
(1.91) 
{8.5,11.0} 
[365] 
9.96 
(1.96) 
{8.6,11.2} 
[373] 
9.66 
(2.41) 
{8.4,10.9} 
[381] 
9.37 
(3.68) 
{8.3,11.0} 
[387] 
9.22 
(4.34) 
{8.1,11.0} 
[387] 
 
Ln (water_energy) 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
6.28 
(1.78) 
{5.1,7.3} 
[293] 
6.60 
(2.07) 
{5.3,8.0} 
[319] 
6.62 
(1.98) 
{5.4,7.9} 
[327] 
6.46 
(2.0) 
{5.1,7.7} 
[335] 
6.25 
(2.1) 
{5.1,7.6} 
[323] 
 
Sources: JCER database and KLCA database 
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TABLE 3: Board structure and globalisation indicators (average values) 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
 
Outside Directors 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
{0.00,0.00} 
[530] 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
{0.00,0.00} 
[552] 
 
1.35 
(1.46) 
{0.00,2.00} 
[610] 
 
1.88 
(1.63) 
{1.00,2.00} 
[656] 
 
2.22 
(1.65) 
{1.00,3.00} 
[672] 
Outside 
Director/Board 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
{0.00,0.00} 
[530] 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
{0.00,0.00} 
[552] 
 
0.21 
(0.17) 
{0.00,0.30} 
[576] 
 
0.30 
(0.17) 
{0.25,0.40} 
[634] 
 
0.35 
(0.16) 
{0.25,0.43} 
[668] 
 
Foreign Ownership 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
2.03 
(6.77) 
{0.00,0.02} 
[293] 
6.09 
(8.54) 
{0.25,9.75} 
[332] 
5.52 
(11.83) 
{0.01,4.58} 
[388] 
10.75 
(15.8) 
{0.21,16.9} 
[408] 
10.87 
(14.64) 
{0.48,16.3} 
[400] 
 
Export/Sales 
(standard deviation) 
{25, 75 percentiles} 
[# of observation] 
13.84 
(24.21) 
{0.00,17.37} 
[368] 
21.65 
(26.43) 
{0.00,34.8} 
[382] 
31.02 
(28.71) 
{4.2,50.2} 
[393] 
30.94 
(29.8) 
{3.1,55.3} 
[413] 
29.35 
(29.9) 
{1.63,56.7} 
[414] 
 
Source: KLCA database 
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TABLE 4: Baseline estimates without interaction variable 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 Foreign Ownership            Export           
                   ------------------------     -----------------------               
          (1)          (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)           (6) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Outside Director(OD)   0.052      0.082*        0.061          0.061        0.077*       0.071* 
                             [0.106]     [0.050]     [0.137]       [0.139]     [0.078]      [0.100] 
Foreign Ownership                                 0.010***   0.009***                           
                                               [0.000]      [0.000]       
Exports                                                                   0.001       0.002** 
                                                                                [0.205]      [0.029]                     
HHI                                                    0.006***                  0.006*** 
                                                                 [0.004]                      [0.002] 
R&D                                                        0.023                        0.018 
                                                                [0.660]                        [0.724] 
Firm Age                                                               0.008                          0.010 
                                                                 [0.426]                       [0.670] 
Firm Age2                                                           -0.000**                  -0.000** 
                                                                     [0.036]                       [0.040] 
Regulation                                            -0.019                    -0.015 
                                                                   [0.367]                     [0.495] 
Training                                                        0.008                      0.009 
                                                               [0.214]                     [0.206] 
Skilled Labor                                              0.214                        0.220 
                                                                  [0.277]                     [0.269] 
Patent Cost                                                 -0.100                     -0.113 
                                                             [0.462]                   [0.389] 
Firm fixed effects   Yes        Yes    Yes          Yes           Yes            Yes 
Year fixed effects   No         Yes    Yes            Yes           Yes            Yes 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                              4561          4561       4384          4361         4561         4385 
2R                                0.245          0.260            0.420         0.436        0.410        0.422 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: p-values in brackets are based on cluster-correlation adjusted estimator. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. R-squared is based on within variation. Constant value is not shown for 
brevity. Outside director is a binary variable with a value of 1 if a firm has appointed at least one outside director 
and zero otherwise. Foreign ownership is the percentage of foreign-owned shares out of total issued shares. HHI is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on the 4-digit industry classification. R&D is a binary variable with a value 
of 1 if a firm’s R&D ratio, measured by the ratio of research and development expenditure to sales multiplied by 
100, is in the highest quartile, and zero otherwise. Firm age and Firm age squared respectively show the time lapsed 
since the firm’s establishment and its square. Regulation is proxied by the sum of the government’s and public 
enterprise’s ownership as a percentage of total shares outstanding. Training refers to (training cost divided by 
employee number)/100. Skilled labor is proxied by white-collar employees divided by total number of employees. 
Patent cost is calculated by 100*(patent cost/sales). Exports are exports scaled by sales in home currency.  
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TABLE 5: Baseline estimation with interaction variables 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        Foreign Ownership   Exports 
    -------------------------------------- -------------------------------                 
           (1)             (2)          (3)           (4)           (5)          (6) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Outside Director(OD)      -0.008        0.012          0.016       -0.037      -0.035       -0.034 
                              [0.848]      [0.770]      [0.692]      [0.405]     [0.442]      [0.435] 
ODForeignOwn         0.013***  0.008**    0.008**                                        
                   [0.001]    [0.011]      [0.014]                                        
Foreign Ownership                          0.006***  0.006***                                        
                                       [0.003]      [0.003]                                        
ODExports                                                     0.004***0.004***0.003*** 
                                                                           [0.003]     [0.005]      [0.004] 
Exports                                                                  0.000          0.001 
                                                                                   [0.775]      [0.165] 
HHI                                      0.006***                               0.006*** 
                                              [0.005]                                         [0.002] 
R&D                                     0.019                                          0.023 
                                            [0.711]                                         [0.666] 
Firm Age                                           0.048***                                  0.048** 
                                                [0.002]                                         [0.011] 
Firm Age2                                     -0.000**                                     -0.000* 
                                          [0.042]                                         [0.068] 
Regulation                                  -0.020                                          -0.016 
                                              [0.326]                                         [0.458] 
Training                                0.008                                           0.010 
                                           [0.217]                                         [0.160] 
Skilled Labor                                  0.227                                            0.250 
                                                 [0.251]                                         [0.210] 
Patent Cost                                        -0.099                                          -0.106 
                                           [0.451]                                         [0.422] 
Firm fixed effects       Yes              Yes       Yes           Yes       Yes         Yes 
Year fixed effects       Yes              Yes        Yes          Yes       Yes         Yes 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                  4384              4384          4361          4561       4561         4395 
2R                     0.421             0.425         0.440         0.416       0.416       0.428 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. p-values in brackets are based 
on cluster-correlation adjusted estimator. The R-squared is based on within variation. Constant value is not shown 
for brevity. ODForeignOwn and ODExports refer to the interaction between outside directors and foreign 
ownership and between outside directors and exports respectively. Refer to Table 4 for definitions of other variables. 
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TABLE 6: Estimates testing for linearity effects 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                (1)                   (2)              (3)           (4) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Low Density of Outside Directors 
pcBODOD 252             -0.092**                            -0.149***              
                           [0.031]                       [0.002]          
ForeignOwnBODOD pc 252             0.002                                        
                             [0.195]                                        
Foreign Ownership                 0.008***         0.008***                           
                           [0.005]            [0.000]                     
ExportBODOD pc 252                                         0.002***              
                                                      [0.003]              
Export                                           0.001           0.002** 
                                                   [0.127]          [0.040] 
High Density of Outside Directors 
pcBODOD 752                                0.063                              0.017 
                                        [0.414]                      [0.856] 
ForeignOwnBODOD pc 752                              0.009*                        
                                        [0.072]                        
ExportBODOD pc 752                                                          0.004* 
                                                                 [0.051] 
Other Control Variables 
HHI                     0.006***        0.006***       0.006***      0.006*** 
                              [0.004]            [0.005]           [0.002]          [0.002] 
R&D                0.022            0.014             0.015             0.012 
                          [0.674]           [0.780]           [0.777]           [0.831] 
Firm Age                         0.052               0.010             0.019            -0.015 
                           [0.300]            [0.338]           [0.405]          [0.643] 
Firm Age2                      -0.000**         -0.000**         -0.000*          -0.000* 
                            [0.030]            [0.047]           [0.056]          [0.051] 
Regulation                 -0.017              -0.018             -0.014           -0.015 
                           [0.403]            [0.404]           [0.585]          [0.479] 
Training                   0.009              0.008              0.010            0.009 
                             [0.195]            [0.229]           [0.185]          [0.194] 
Skilled Labor                     0.208               0.234             0.221            0.238 
                           [0.293]            [0.238]           [0.265]          [0.233] 
Patent Cost                -0.116            -0.089            -0.125           -0.107 
                            [0.416]            [0.505]           [0.386]          [0.856] 
Firm fixed effects                Yes            Yes           Yes          Yes 
Year fixed effects                Yes            Yes           Yes          Yes      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                         4361              4361                4385              4385 
2R                              0.436             0.439                0.425             0.427 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. p-values in brackets are based 
on cluster-correlation adjusted estimator. The R-squared is based on within variation. Constant value is not shown 
for brevity. 
pcBODOD 252  and pcBODOD 752 refer respectively to low density of outside directors and high 
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density of outside directors with threshold values of the 25 percentile and 75 percentile on the spectrum representing 
the ratio of outside directors to total directors BOD. Refer to Table 4 for the definitions of other variables. 
 
TABLE 7: Results for chaebol affiliates and independent firms 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        Foreign Ownership   Exports 
    -------------------------------------- ------------------------------- 
    Affiliate    Independent firm         Affiliate Independent firm
           (1)             (2)                 (3)               (4)             
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Outside Director (OD)    0.248*       -0.025           0.196       -0.079 
                      [0.050]       [0.520]         [0.103]      [0.104] 
ODForeignOwn       0.005         0.007**                           
                    [0.436]       [0.011] 
Foreign Ownership          0.013**     0.003*                           
                    [0.020]       [0.079] 
ODExports                                                          0.003        0.003** 
                                                 [0.342]      [0.022] 
Exports                                                                  0.004        0.001 
                                                 [0.283]      [0.556] 
HHI                        0.019***   0.005**                       0.022***   0.005** 
                      [0.007]       [0.020]         [0.007]      [0.011] 
R&D                                  0.011       -0.015          -0.005       -0.011 
                    [0.926]       [0.693]         [0.968]      [0.780] 
Firm Age                          0.046         0.073***                    0.022        0.098*** 
                     [0.323]       [0.020]         [0.678]      [0.000] 
Firm Age2                        0.000        -0.000**         0.000       -0.000** 
                     [0.831]       [0.015]         [0.945]      [0.019] 
Regulation                       -0.016        -0.036         -0.014       -0.033 
                    [0.785]       [0.132]        [0.812]      [0.192] 
Training                0.000          0.009            0.005        0.010 
                      [0.998]       [0.197]         [0.777]      [0.186] 
Patent Cost                    -0.258***    0.103         -0.282***    0.073 
                    [0.000]       [0.558]       [0.000]      [0.650] 
Firm fixed effects       Yes  Yes               Yes           Yes        
Year fixed effects       Yes  Yes                  Yes           Yes        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     1123      3238        1135         3258 
2R                  0.475        0.492                      0.455         0.482 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. p-values in brackets are based 
on cluster-correlation adjusted estimator.
2R is based on within variation. Constant value is not shown for brevity. 
ODForeignOwn and ODExports refer to the interaction between outside director/s and foreign ownership and 
between outside director/s and exports respectively. Refer to Table 4 for the definitions of other variables. 
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TABLE 8: Results with first-order autocorrelation 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)            (6) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Outside Director(OD) -0.011       -0.004         -0.003      -0.005      -0.002      0.008 
                    [0.580]      [0.848]        [0.867]   [0.826]     [0.940]      [0.739] 
ODForeignOwn        0.004***  0.003**    0.003***                                        
                         [0.000]      [0.030]      [0.007]                                        
Foreign Ownership                      0.003***  0.002***                                        
                                  [0.003]      [0.005]                                        
ODExports                                                      0.001         0.001        0.000 
                                                                [0.176]      [0.274]      [0.568] 
Exports                                                                        0.000     0.001*** 
                                                                                  [0.372]      [0.004] 
HHI                                             0.006***                                  0.006*** 
                                                     [0.000]                                 [0.000] 
R&D                                        0.009                                   0.004 
                                                      [0.616]                                      [0.836] 
Firm Age                                                0.014                                     0.003 
                                                   [0.498]                                     [0.928] 
Firm Age2                                               -0.001**                                      -0.000** 
                                                    [0.011]                                   [0.025] 
Regulation                                           -0.009                                -0.009 
                                                        [0.481]                                [0.496] 
Training                                             0.000                                  0.000 
                                                     [0.997]                                  [0.951] 
Skilled Labor                                             0.001                                     0.029 
                                                    [0.994]                                    [0.692] 
Patent Cost                                            0.035                                     0.034 
                                                     [0.761]                                    [0.764] 
Firm fixed effects     Yes            Yes          Yes         Yes            Yes        Yes 
Year fixed effects     Yes          Yes          Yes         Yes            Yes         Yes 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                3993          3993           3974          4167            4167          3991 
2R                  0.201         0.203          0.216         0.195          0.195        0.208 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: p-values in brackets are based on cluster-correlation adjusted estimator. ***, ** and * denote significance  at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The R-squared is based on within variation. Constant value is not shown. 
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TABLE 9: Instrumental variable estimation for baseline with interaction 
variables 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        (1)           (2)             (3)           (4) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Outside Director(OD)   -0.262*         -0.215         -0.691*        -0.696* 
                    [0.088]          [0.147]        [0.052]       [0.058] 
ODForeignOwn           0.051**      0.043*                           
                    [0.042]          [0.073]                           
Foreign Ownership        -0.008           -0.005                           
                  [0.316]          [0.468]                           
ODExports                                      0.023**         0.023** 
                                                         [0.035]         [0.041] 
Exports                                      0.000       0.001 
                                                [0.969]        [0.506] 
HHI                            0.005***                   0.008*** 
                                        [0.000]                             [0.000] 
R&D                              -0.006                              0.053 
                                         [0.875]                                 [0.122] 
Firm Age                             0.047                     0.009 
                                          [0.262]                          [0.859] 
Firm Age2                                      -0.000***                               0.000 
                                          [0.002]                          [0.961] 
Regulation                            -0.028                    -0.017 
                                       [0.157]                 [0.371] 
Training                               0.005                    0.017*** 
                                          [0.236]                                 [0.005] 
Skilled Labor                     0.228**               0.348*** 
                                         [0.023]                  [0.007] 
Patent Cost                    -0.023                   -0.085 
                               [0.914]                   [0.647] 
Firm fixed effects       Yes                Yes         Yes       Yes        
Year fixed effects       Yes                Yes           Yes       Yes        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                  3548      3542        3733          3718 
2R                   0.259      0.319           0.182          0.203 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: p-values in brackets are based on the cluster-correlation adjusted estimator. ***, ** and * denotes 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. R-squared is based on within variation.  Constant value is 
not shown for brevity. Foreign ownership, exports and their interaction variables are regarded as endogenous. The 
instrument variables used include first and second lags of own (endogenous suspected) variables as well as net profit 
per share for all models (and dividend payout ratio for foreign ownership for Models 1 and 2. 
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TABLE 10: Results for the baseline model with different measure of productivity 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        Foreign Ownership   Exports 
    -------------------------------------- -------------------------------
           (1)            (2)            (3)               (4)            (5)            (6) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Outside Director (OD)     0.051        -0.064       -0.052       -0.140*     -0.100     -0.107 
                    [0.324]      [0.238]     [0.314]      [0.076]      [0.238]    [0.194] 
ODForeignOwn       0.022***   0.016**   0.011**                                        
                     [0.005]    [0.019]     [0.010]                                              
Foreign Ownership                         0.012***  0.016**                                        
                                       [0.009]     [0.020]                                         
ODExports                                                    0.007***    0.006*     0.006* 
                                                                  [0.009]      [0.074]    [0.064] 
Exports                                                                   0.003   0.005*** 
                                                                            [0.152]     [0.009] 
HHI                                     0.006***                              0.007*** 
                                            [0.002]                                       [0.001] 
R&D                                    0.024                                         0.042 
                                                [0.694]                                       [0.516] 
Firm Age                                          0.097***                                   0.169** 
                                             [0.000]                                       [0.010] 
Firm Age2                                     -0.000***                                 -0.000** 
                                          [0.009]                                       [0.041] 
Regulation                                 -0.054                                        -0.066 
                                          [0.248]                                       [0.215] 
Training                              0.001                                         0.002 
                                            [0.368]                                       [0.283] 
Patent Cost                                       -0.411**                                 -0.432*** 
                                               [0.014]                                      [0.004] 
Firm fixed effects       Yes  Yes          Yes  Yes      Yes           Yes 
Year fixed effects       Yes  Yes           Yes            Yes      Yes          Yes 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                   5246      5246         5228          5680         5680        5280 
2R                  0.329            0.339        0.358          0.336         0.338        0.340 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. p-values in brackets are based 
on the cluster-correlation adjusted estimator. R-squared is based on within variation. Constant value is not shown for 
brevity. See Tables 4 and 5 for definitions of the variables. 
 
 
 
